Saturday, October 26, 2013

Tuesday, October 22, 2013

The Great "White" Quest for Energy

As an anthropology major with minors in biology and chemistry, I have absolutely loved connecting human nature and culture with the biological and chemical aspects of the physical sciences. I often find myself unconsciously making these connections in a series of mini-epiphanies as I sit in class listening to a lecture, as I engage in discussion, or as I complete readings or problem sets on my own. However, it is not very often that I encounter a theorist (in any of the disciplines) that has already made these connections between physical and social science for me. This was the case in reading “Energy and Tools,” written by Leslie White in 1959.

Having these connections previously determined by White required me to think deeply about applying my own understanding of these concepts to the theoretical perspective already outlined, thus causing me to engage with the piece as I seldom had before, further eliciting strong opinions of agreement and/or disagreement. Although I have called my own revelations and connections between disciplines “mini-epiphanies” and they may seem to be so at the time of their inception, my own connections are often disjointed and end up being too far extrapolated to withstand the test of any theoretical questioning. As I was reading White, I felt that he had pushed the concept a little too far, but that, through further analysis, his work could be seen as relevant if examined through a very specific lens.

Leslie White was a student of Edward Sapir in the Boasian tradition but, as seen by his dramatic departure from this theory, obviously found it unsatisfying. He is often considered to be a neo-evolutionist and cultural ecologist. In his work, it is apparent that White sought evolutionary, causal explanations for cultural difference and cultural change by trying to apply the physical science to the social science of people. As I have found when my own “mini-epiphanies” fall flat, making these connections is very difficult and they generally turn out to be non-correlative.

In “Energy and Tools,” White explains that the “dynamic material system” in which we live can be described and made understandable in terms of energy magnitudes and transformations. As one of White’s primary points of interest, we explains how the second law of thermodynamics (the law of entropy, i.e. that it is more energetically favorable for entities to exist in states of higher randomness or chaos). Further, White explains that “living systems are a means of arresting, and even of reversing, the cosmic drift toward maximum entropy.” In saying this, he explains that using more energy as it flows through living systems in order to build more complicated structures, living species are able to evolve. This statement shows his belief that more complicated structures imply a higher level of evolution. White believed that culture did evolve over time from the simple to the complex, from basic organization to a greater specialization of parts. He equated this cultural evolution to that of organisms. White’s theory regarding cultural evolution appears to create new relevance for the ideas of Lewis Henry Morgan, who saw the evolution of societies from simple to complex in a very similar way. White provides the explanation for this cultural evolution as dependent on the amount of energy harnessed per capita per year or upon the efficiency of technology for utilizing the energy previously harnessed increases. By exploring this argument for the course of cultural evolution, it is evident that White believes that cultural complexity is equated with energy utilization and productivity.

White introduces an equation that he believes to be generally useful for all populations. Throughout the piece, the equation expands to include those factors which White finds to be relevant. The final equations given are:

E (H x N) x T > P
[Where E = energy involved, T = the technological means of using it, H=human components of the energy factor, N = nonhuman components of the energy factor, and P = the product that will result which serves the need of man.]

And

E x T x V -> P
[Where E = energy involved, T = the technological means of using it, V = environment, and P = the product that will result which serves the need of man.]

These equations work to find a general way in which all cultural evolution can be expressed in terms of an equation. This generalization is highly different from the ideas of Boas and those in his functionalist school of thought and marks a return to the desire to understand general behavior of humans as in the nineteenth century.

Despite the opposition to the school of thought of his teacher, Sapir, White continues to explain his argument in a binary way. White explains that life can evolve and be expressed as 1) the multiplication of organisms (quantitative change) and 2) the development of higher forms (a quantitative change). He explains the struggle for existence and survival as 1) the adjustment of an organism to its habitat and 2) as a struggle with other living beings. He also explains that energy can be harnassed and expended in both biological and mechanical ways. In addition to many other examples where he expressed ideas in sets of twos, the quantitative and qualitative binary exists throughout the piece and shows the influence of linguists such as Saussure, Sapir, and Whorf and of structuralists such as Lévi-Strauss, whose works rely on the role of opposition and the supposedly inherent binary structure of the world in which we live. 

As an addition to the reading based upon what was learned in lecture, White explains that there are three cultural subsystems: the technological, sociological, and the ideological, but iterates that he believes it is the technological improvements are what generally drive cultural change, but that all three influence each other and provide feedback to one another. This is similar to the ideas held by Kroeber.

When I first read this piece, I was overwhelmed by how much I did not agree with it. So many facets of his argument, especially those related to the role of entropy within the everyday world, seemed as if they had been extrapolated far past the points possible. I agree that the second law of thermodynamics drives small, molecular actions forwards and I understand the stereo chemical and conformational processes in which it does so. But I found one large flaw between the role of entropy on an atomic, chemical level and the role of entropy on a large-scale, cultural level. This difference is that those molecules at a small, chemical level do not think. They simply act in a way which allows them to exist in their lowest energy conformation. These changes are made involuntarily based on surrounding conditions and possible conformations. Unless affected by an outside source, at no point would the molecule act in a way that was not energetically favorable – it could never “think” to stay in a higher energy conformation for the greater good of the individual cell or structure. However, humans who, according to White and many other anthropologists, create culture do have the ability to think. This theory of entropically driven culture does not account for empathy, desire to communicate socially, desire to build relationships, reciprocity, aesthetics, or anything of the sort. By not accounting for emotion or human through processes, White ignores a large portion of what it means to be human.

In the reading questions following the article, it is asked what White means by culture. His lack of and/or ambiguous definition makes this work unclear and makes the conclusions of the work difficult to relate to other theorists. White essentially implies that the gathering of energy is the primary goal of human life and that culture provides a mean to that end. However, according to Malinowski, it is a latent function of culture and not one that is not necessarily actively sought at all times and in all ways, but instead a byproduct of the combination of the most primary seven items from the hierarchy of need.

However, as I sat in class, I realized that the highly structured and logical approach of this article does the best job of any anthropological theorist we have read so far to connect the physical and social sciences. Although I disagreed with the claims he made on the surface level, reading White’s work helped me to understand how the need for energy and the need to collect and process this energy is incredibly important and something that we, as humans, think about all day long. Whether we are hungry for our next meal or looking at how transportation can be made more efficient using less fuel and manpower (thus allowing more efficient use of manpower and transportation of food and alternate forms of energy), we are, in fact, actively thinking about the ways in which energy of all kinds affects the world around us.


I find it most helpful to think of White’s work in terms of how humans seek efficiency and energy in all aspects of daily life, which can then be seen as shaping culture, but not using culture as a means to strictly find efficiency in gathering energy from around us. For there are a great number of cultural facets, needs, concepts, and products that cannot be explained as means to increase efficiency and energy sources. However, there is no doubt that these aspects of culture are dramatically influenced and shaped by the need to obtain energy from sources around us in the most efficient means possible.

Monday, October 21, 2013

Harris and the Etic and Emic Viewpoints

Today in class, thought we spoke much about Leslie White and cultural ecology, today in class we did not talk much about the other cultural ecologist (or Cultural Materialist) Marvin Harris.  In his work, “The Epistemology of Cultural Materialism”, he discusses the phenomena of anthropologist and the use of emic and etic viewpoints when studying a culture in depth.  First off, this is somewhat of push for a balanced approach when studying a culture.  He attempts to promote a somewhat balanced view and says that researchers should observe cultures in both the emic and etic viewpoints.  The way he does it, however, seems to be anything but.  He seems to only promote the Etic viewpoint throughout the entire work.  In the beginning of the article he begins by showing the faults of Linguist Kenneth Pike, who coined the terms emic and etic that is used today.  He goes on to say that Pike has a sort of “behavioremes” that only seem to only focus on the emic view point and also not show a lot more about the structure of behavioral stream etically.  He also goes on to provide examples in his own works in Southern India with the male cow population and also with some of his informants in Brazil.  The way Harris writes this work clearly shows his preference for the Etic viewpoint. 

He believes that etic viewpoint is an essential part of the study of a culture is because gives the researcher more information that an emic view cannot give them.  An example he uses is the usage of the letters p and b.  The distinction of its uses, as well as the rules for using them may not be so obvious when using the emic approach to studying these two phonemes.  It would take an outsider, or and etic perspective, to show that p and b can be pronounced in different manners and that switching one letter for another can result in a completely different word being used.  Harris also stresses the fact that sometimes, even though one strives use the etic viewpoint, may actually become a hindrance.  He uses his example of trying pry open the minds of the Brazilian children to see why they only wore one shoe to school and how his  etic viewpoint mislead him to his own false conclusions.  This is the only time in the article I felt he actually maintain this balanced view point of the need to use both the etic and emic viewpoint.  If one uses this method, and uncovering the innate systems and meaning of the systems can help uncover its uses and significance in society.  

Education and Anthropology

Even though I am not always back home, I try to at least keep pace with the big hustle and bustle of my hometown, Los Angeles.  One of the major issues that the city usually confronts with is the massive amount of immigrants that come across the border from Mexico and into the Los Angeles.  Much like my parents, many of these immigrants strive for their children to receive ever famed “American Education”.  However, what is the school system to do when so many of these children, brought up in a Spanish speaking household go into kindergarten and or higher level education without knowing much English?  Well in the article linked about, describes what L.A. Country is doing right now.  Currently, schools are being reorganized by the level of English proficiency a child has currently. 

Here is the link to the full story:

Political beliefs aside, this and many other issues can be assessed by viewing them anthropologically.  I tried to view this article in the mindset of a structural functionalist.  To start, the first question that arose for me after reading this article was, what was the need for a segregation based on language proficiency? One of the functions of school as a crucial institution is to teach children the improper and proper usages of the English languages.  So just looking at this function alone, it does make sense to divide and organize the classes in this manner.  For the system as a whole, this would also help make the functioning of it easier as well.  This division based on language proficiency would allow investigators and supervisors to examine the progression of these children.  From a structural functionalist point of view, this seems to be a way to somewhat of a way to assess to what extent this new reorganization fulfill that function
The article also centers on the social function of schools as well.  In the article they mention a concern that students learn more efficiently due to the fact they’re around people whom they can learn more better and also native English.  This aspect of the article exemplifies one of Malinowski’s point of a cultural aspect meeting a need.  In this case, not only does school meet a need for growth for not only the children, but also their parents, assuring them (giving them some sort of security) that their children will grow into intellectual adults.  The reason why this policy is debated is because parents feel that it would hinder the fulfillment of their children’s needs. 

However, this issue also sparks up some Marxian points as well, especially for the readers.  Never once in this article is race ever mentioned in article aside from the example at the beginning. Yet somehow in the comments section of the article, the issue of race becomes the focal point in the comments section.  The reason for that is because although they may not be aware of this fact, but school also has another function that is not as overt as it seems.  The education system in Los Angeles (myself being a product of that system) also serves as an introduction to the world around them.  Children during these critical years in their life are shaped by the school environment as well the people around them.  This change would serve as prelude to how they imagine how the world is divided.  Not only by levels of English, but also by race as well.  Many of the immigrant children may begin to see their place not only in school, but also in general society at a young age.  Due to the fact that most of the children in the lower English proficiency class are immigrant or children of immigrants, they may learn that all of society functions like this as well.  Though possibly unaware of it, this is what the parents are fighting to change.  Karl Marx would see this as the bourgeois inhibiting future proletariats so that they’ll know their place and learn their function in the capitalist society (praxis).  The proletariat struggle to somehow make its way to the same level as the proletariat.


Explanation and Insight into Marvin Harris' "The Epistemology of Cultural Materialism"

In The Epistemology of Cultural Materialism, Marvin Harris provides a titillating discussion of the emic and etic perspectives, using examples and commentary to show how each can be a pathway to gaining insight about human behavior. While I cannot expand in detail on the entire work here, I intend to draw attention to key points and provide afterthoughts.

Harris is most well-known for his work in developing the anthropological realm of cultural materialism. A set of ideas within the umbrella of cultural ecology, cultural materialism forms distinctions between behavioral and mental events and the etic and emic perspectives to guide anthropological research. In the first sections of The Epistemology of Cultural Materialism, Harris draws on Karl Marx’s strategy to “demystify” social life by seeking to learn who individuals are not as they are perceived by others, but as they actually exist. Through the medium of Marx, Harris here is pointing to the problem that anthropologists are fallible humans, with widely varying internalized structures and mental frameworks for interpreting the world, attempting to study other humans in order to generate scientific truth. As a cultural materialist, Harris acts to remedy this problem with a twofold solution. First, Harris divides the study of human social life into behavioral and mental fields. The behavioral field is “all the body motions and environmental effects produced by such motions, large and small, of all the human beings who have ever lived,” while the mental field is “all the thoughts and feelings we humans experience with our minds.” This distinction allows us to differentiate between what is happening internally and externally with an individual. The second remedy Harris employs to the problem anthropologists have of working as humans studying humans is to recognize the emic and etic perspectives. The emic perspective elevates the native, the one being studied, while the etic perspective elevates the scientific observer’s perceptions and values this person’s divisions of social behavior.  

In introducing the terms etic and emic, Harris notes that we must be careful in using the divisions in conjunction with mental and behavioral divisions of social behavior. He charges Kenneth Pike, the coiner of the terms emic and etic (the suffixes from phonemic and phonetic, respectively), with being heavily biased towards an emic perspective. Kenneth valued the etic perspective as a stepping stone to reaching the emic perspective. Harris argues that this use should not be favored because etic analysis will only lead to insight regarding etic structure, while emic analysis will only lead to insight on emic structure. Further, one is not more epistemologically correct or “truer” than the other, but instead both emic and etic perspectives can reveal information that can be subjective or objective. Harris also dispels the idea that etic data must somehow precede emic interpretation, keenly noting that the first information acquired about an individual in a society (and thus, the society as a whole) comes from questions like “what are the people over there doing,” a method that will yield emic information before the scientific observer can categorize it using etic approaches.

Harris nears an end to his work by discussing examples that show how deciphering certain categories in his matrix of emic, etic, behavioral, and mental sociocultural fields can be challenging. He provides the example of schoolchildren regularly attending school with only one shoe on in a small Brazilian town. When Harris asked the children why they did so, they claimed that they had a sore on the foot without a shoe, despite Harris never being able to identify such sores. He falsely hypothesized that children must like to go to school barefoot. Upon further inquiry with adults however, he learned that siblings would each wear a shoe from a single pair so they could economize. This example shows how the etic/mental cross-section in the matrix can be challenging when one hypothesizes about what individuals are thinking with inaccurate information or baseless assumptions. He also cites the example of a farmer versus a scientific observer discussing how a field is watered. Neither the emic farmer nor the etic observer’s perspectives have more value than the other in this case.

 The Epistemology of Cultural Materialism provides a great, if brief, explanation of the thinking that goes into a cultural materialist approach. The divisions between the etic and emic and the behavioral and mental categories of social behavior provide a useful means to learn about culture through the individuals within a society. Harris also provides a convincing argument that the etic and emic perspectives should be valued equally on their own terms, not as stepping stones to one or the other perspective. It would be informative however if Harris had expanded on the utility of using both approaches in unison through a comprehensive methodology to learn. While I agree that etic/emic analysis leads to insight regarding etic/emic structure, it seems the yielded knowledge from these approaches does not need to remain separate in perpetuity. Perhaps with structural insight from both approaches together, more nuanced understandings of particular cultures can be acquired. This lack of unity between the etic and emic perspectives seems to be symptomatic of Harris’s dismissal of broad, cross-cultural approaches. He writes “What difference does it make if a similar belief is found in a thousand … cultures? As long as the concept is real, meaningful, and appropriate to the members of those cultures, it remains an emic concept with respect to those cultures.” Harris argues in the section this quote is pulled from, Cross-Cultural Emics, that certain societal traits should not be considered etic just because they are exhibited across multiple cultures. This is a sentiment I can support, but he fails to expand and say what he does believe qualifies as etic. I am not of the persuasion that no activity counts as etic, and the utility of recognizing patterns and noting key differences between cultures should not be ignored. For many people, the most relevant information derived from cultural anthropological research is how it relates back to their own experiences within their own culture. It is unclear from my interpretation of this essay how Harris feels about cross cultural comparison, but it seems that he finds it to have minimal value relative to the emic and etic structures of individual cultures. Still, his work here provides great insight into the cultural materialistic means of understanding human interaction.  


-Phil

Sunday, October 20, 2013

Rituals of Rebellion in Shakespeare's Henry IV: Socio-Cultural Blog

The application of Max Gluckman’s argument in his “Rituals of Rebellion in South-East Africa” to Shakespeare’s I Henry IV not only provides a new reading of the Act II role play scene between Falstaff and Hal, but it also generates a thought-provoking analysis of the greater political struggle between King Henry and the rebels.  In order to place the two texts in meaningful conversation, it is first necessary to offer a brief background of the context of the play.  King Henry faces a group of political dissenters, “the rebels,” who are headed by the Percy family.  The rebels assert that their cause is just because of Henry’s unnatural ascent to the throne when he “put down Richard, that sweet lovely rose, / And plant[ed] this thorn, this canker, Bolingbroke;” referring, that is, to Henry himself (I.III.175-6).  To clarify, Richard II was deposed by Henry, who from this very act of rebellion has now invited the same fate for himself. Henry’s choice to wrest the throne from Richard, then, not only calls into question Henry’s validity as king, but also subverts the authority of heredity succession to dictate ascension to the throne.  This insecurity in the line of succession is epitomized in Henry’s own acknowledgment that Hotspur, Percy’s son, is a better representation of an heir than his own Hal, who seems to only revel in the tavern world.  The play moves between these questions of legitimacy, with 1 Henry IV culminating in Hal’s fulfillment of his duty as heir by killing Hotspur on the battlefield, thereby reinstating faith in the line of succession.  Henry’s validity as king is also restored through Hal’s actions and the end of the rebellion is signaled with this victory and Henry’s assumption of the crown in 2 Henry IV

Rituals of rebellion, despite potentially calling into question the legitimacy of those wearing the vestments of authority, do not challenge the system which dictates this power.  Gluckman articulates that “these ritual rebellions proceed within an established and sacred traditional system, in which there is dispute about particular distributions of power, and not about the structure of the system itself.” (198)  The universality of this statement allows its model to extend beyond Gluckman’s South-East African examples.  In fact, it overlays well with the political context of Shakespeare’s I Henry IV.  The parallel between the two was suggested earlier, but not overtly stated.  In regards to the play, the “established and sacred traditional system” is the English system kingship that is cracked in Richard II’s deposition.  The rebel cause is the manifestation of the “dispute about particular distributions of power,” as the crown itself, or the kingship, is not being called into question, but instead Henry’s validity as their representing figure.  The rebels are contesting Henry himself, not the kingship, as they will inevitably transfer the crown to another head if successful.  As encapsulated by Gluckman’s analysis of the African political sphere, these “Contenders for power against established authority sought only to acquire the same positions of authority for themselves.” (208) Gluckman, however, goes a step farther and proposes that these rituals of rebellion “allow(s) for instituted protest, and in complex ways renew(s) the unity of the system.” (198)  On a greater scale than these isolated, choreographed rituals, Gluckman also poses the question that “If this emphasis on potential rebellion in practice made the nation feel united, is it not possible that civil rebellion itself was a source of strength to these systems?” (210) 

The play speaks to both the function and significance of these ceremonial rituals of rebellion, such as the Swazi incwala ceremony, or first-fruits ceremony, as well as to the possibility of large-scale civil rebellions to counter-intuitively perpetuate and affirm the existing structures of hierarchy and power.  In Act II, the scene in which Falstaff and Hal take turns imitating King Henry structurally echoes the traits which Gluckman identifies in the Swazi incwala ceremony. Hal and Falstaff act out the same subconscious elements which Gluckman identifies: “For the [established] order itself keeps this rebellion within bounds,” as well as the idea that “his personal isolation,” though they “dramatically express the real alignments of struggles for power in the system,” do in fact “intensify actions and emotions expressing loyalty.” (208;209) 

Consider the scene between Falstaff and Hal.  Hal, who has been neglecting his duties as son and heir by engaging in the pursuits and frivolities of the tavern world, has been summoned by his father back to court.  To practice for this meeting, Hal asks Falstaff, “Do thou stand for my father, and examine me upon the / particulars of my life.” (II.IV. 343-4) Falstaff replies, “Content.  This chair shall be my state, this / dagger my scepter, and this cushion my crown.” (II.IV.345-5) Here, Falstaff embodies a ritual of rebellion by pretending to assume the vestments of the kingship in order to embody the authority associated with them.  However, this is only a devaluation of the accoutrements of power, as evidenced by Hal’s mocking, “Thy state is taken for a joint stool, they golden scepter / for a leaden dagger, and they precious rich crown for a / pitiful bald crown.” (II.IV.347-9) Although Falstaff is metaphorically enacting a usurpation of Henry, seen especially in his offhanded “Depose me?” to Hal when they switch positions, the action has no tangible effect on the kingship (II.IV.396).  To clarify, although Falstaff is given the opportunity to play the king, as well as to occupy a higher position than Hal, he is well aware that this is only allowed because it is no more than an imitation of the “real” kingship. 

This is further reinforced by the successive role reversal between Hal and Falstaff.  Hal assumes the position of his father, King Henry, while Falstaff plays Hal.  As the heir to the throne, Hal carries a similar authority as his father, even if he has not yet acknowledged this in the play.  At the conclusion of their conversation Falstaff as Hal pleads to the king (Hal) “…but for sweet Jack Falstaff… / banish not him thy / Harry’s company, banish not him they Harry’s company - / banish plump Jack, and banish the world,” to which Hal replies with the telling, “I do, I will.” (II.IV.434-9) Here Hal asserts the authority of the king over his subjects, particularly the power of the royal court over its subjects.  Echoing Gluckman’s observation that “order itself keeps this rebellion within bounds,” Hal asserts the authority of the kingship.  Both Hal and Falstaff recognize that their playthings are only imitations of the “true” crown, scepter, and throne.  In essence, they are reinforcing the legitimacy of Henry’s kingship by distinguishing between these items and their props; though they both play at being king, both recognize that they do so only through comparison to Henry’s crown, which is metaphorically and jokingly, but never ideologically, contested. 

To conclude, the play provides an affirmative argument for Gluckman’s question that “If this emphasis on potential rebellion in practice made the nation feel united, is it not possible that civil rebellion itself was a source of strength to these systems?”  (210) For Shakespeare’s I Henry IV, the instability which Henry causes through the deposition of Richard II generates an environment susceptible to the threat of rebellion.  The success of Henry’s own rebellion calls into question not the authority of the kingship, but his own personal validity as king.  Hal serves as the solution to legitimizing Henry’s kingship and eventually ending the rebellion.  Hal’s defeat of Hotspur, the figurehead of the rebel movement, at the conclusion of play proves Hal’s worth as heir to the throne and, by through renewing faith in the principle of hereditary succession, in turn reaffirms Henry’s kingship.  The civil rebellion, then, is Hal’s touchstone for asserting his duty as heir and its successful defeat perpetuates the authority of the kingship. 

To add a brief note: I acknowledge that this example only “works” to answer Gluckman’s question in the positive because the rebellion is successfully put down.  If the rebels had not been defeated, then the analogy of this civil unrest as a true “ritual of rebellion” in Gluckman’s sense could be more easily refuted.  However, the play does function interestingly on the dual levels of Gluckman’s argument by providing a ceremonial rebellion (Hal and Falstaff’s Act II exchange) which on the surface may put tension on the authority system, but subconsciously asserts its primacy, as well as illustrating how large-scale civil rebellions may function in much the same way as the ritualized rebellions. 



Shakespeare, William. Henry IV Parts One and Two. Ed. Ronald L. Levao. United States:
Pearson Education, Inc., 2007. Print.

Thursday, October 17, 2013

Speaking Klingon: An Essay on the Utility of Language

One of the great things about anthropology is that its tools are widely applicable. Anthropologists have carved out niches for themselves in diverse areas ranging from multimillion dollar corporations to impoverished ghettos. Anywhere people interact, there is a potential for anthropological interpretation. While the anthropologist’s toolkit has equipment suitable for numerous jobs, one task it is particularly well-adapted for is interpreting bizarre behavior. Actions have meanings and purpose, and anthropology allows us to make sense of the world of social interactions around us by distilling underlying ideas from human behavior. In this essay, I intend to demonstrate this application of anthropology through an especially unusual case study.

D’Armond Speers is one of about 30 people on Earth capable of fluently speaking Klingon. This constructed language was invented for the Klingon race on the hit television series, Star Trek. In 1984, Marc Okrand published The Klingon Dictionary, a work that embodies the words and grammatical structure of the language. Considered canon today, Okrand’s text reveals that Klingon is designed to sound both alien and fierce. This is evidenced by the numerous terms in Klingon for acts like fighting and the many terms considered profane. Words for acts of aggression, war, and other similar concepts abound, an unsurprising fact considering these are topics of paramount interest for the strong, quick to act Klingons, but terms that reference actions and objects more germane to human life, like expressions for an open passageway, a spoon, or one’s aunt, have only recently been added. The emphasis of the Klingon lexicon on extraterrestrial life and battle (and lack of terms for common Earthly elements) can make the language cumbersome for human speakers. This did not sway Speers from learning, however. Both Star Trek fans and those interested in the study of language alike have been captivated by the Klingon language. While most people only dabble in the language briefly, the more devoted hobbyists are capable of forming sentences and expressing themselves like a Klingon warlord when they desire.

Shakespeare's Hamlet is one of the more popular works translated into Klingon. 
Speers, a Ph. D in linguistics, decided to put his interest in Klingon to task. For the first five years of his son Alec’s life, he spoke to him almost exclusively in Klingon. Humans adopt language much more easily as children than as adults. Children who learn a second language more readily adopt other languages when they are older. Speers wanted to know if learning Klingon as a second language would still provide this benefit, and also if the language would be retained in older life. While Alec and his father spoke to each other in Klingon, the rest of the family and society spoke to Alec in English, so he was not limited in this regard. While Alec learned many phrases and expressions as a child, occasionally preferring them to their English equivalents, he stopped speaking Klingon entirely when he was about five years old. At this point, D’Armond recognized his son was no longer interested in speaking to him in Klingon, so he ended his experiment. Alec did not continue speaking Klingon, and seems to have not retained his abilities in later life.

Amusing Rosetta Stone commercial about learning to speak Alien languages

While it is easy to spitball ideas about why Alec did not retain his Klingon language abilities, we can perhaps come to more nuanced conclusions using anthropological theory. For starters, this example fails to lend credence to the so-called “Sapir-Whorf hypothesis,” a term that infuriates anthropologists across the board. Named for two pioneers in American linguistics, the term references the idea that culture is determined by language (not the other way around) and asserts that language shapes and limits how people interpret the world. Among other problems, this idea is quite a stretch beyond what Sapir and Whorf ever argued in their works. As an extreme example, it seems that this hypothesis would suggest Alec would have warlike tendencies and view other cultures as conquerable entities since he grew up speaking Klingon. Alec’s perception of reality would be literally shaped by the patterns he unconsciously absorbed from Klingon. This is of course very silly, yet it is what this term appears to imply. A more accurate notion derived from Sapir and Whorf’s works is that language and culture have similar structures, and that the two reinforce each other.
 
Sapir describes in his works how both human social behavior and language are learned unconsciously. Compare how we learn language as children to how we learn language as adults. If we had to learn our second language the same way we learned our first, then no one would speak anything! Fortunately, we are able to naturalize patterns very easily when we are young. Whorf expanded on this idea by theorizing that grammatical patterns can be connected to cultural patterns. Whorf and Sapir believed that these patterns give structure to our thought, even though the rules governing such structures were distilled unconsciously and not explicitly taught to us when we were young. Consequently, these structures led to logic and gave meaning to the world around us. With this in mind, we can return to our problem of Alec’s disinterest in speaking Klingon. What would Sapir and Whorf have to say about Klingon and the conclusion of D’Armond’s project? I hypothesize that they would find Klingon amusing and interesting, yet very different from other languages for one key reason. While the languages spoken widely around the world are mirrored and grounded in cultural meaning, Klingon’s cultural meaning is mostly limited to the world of Star Trek. From Sapir and Whorf’s perspective, Alec’s choice to speak English resulted from the reinforcement of the patterns unconsciously learned from the language in society around him, not just from the fact that everyone other than his father spoke English to him. Since Alec never watched Star Trek (D’Armond once dressed as a Klingon for his son, but it frightened him so much he never did it again) and certainly did not spend time with Klingons, there was no cultural reinforcement of the patterns he unconsciously learned from Klingon. The patterns in English, however, were reflected in the societal structure where his life took place. Klingon was so distinct from all the other structures forming in Alec’s mind that it eventually lost its utility because it lacked parallels in society. With the only bridge between the two distinct language structures being Alec’s interactions with his father, Klingon was discarded because English was such a superior means of interpreting the world around him.

While from the beginning it is clear why learning to speak Klingon may be objectionable, anthropological theory allows us to reach more nuanced conclusions than we could reach without an interpretive framework. Instead of saying that learning Klingon is pointless simply because no one speaks it, we can comment on how it is not reflected in the unconscious mental structures we use to interpret the world around us and thus lacks utility. While this hypothesis is not necessarily more correct than saying Klingon is useless because no one speaks the language, it generates more proactive discussion and can be defended with examples drawn from anthropological research, leading to better hypotheses and more defensible arguments. To reiterate, it seems Sapir and Whorf would find Klingon an interesting plaything and a fun exercise in studying language. But since Klingons do not exist on Earth, it fails to provide humans with suitable means to interpret the world around them.


-Phillip

Further Reading:

Wednesday, October 16, 2013

Captain Phillips



An Investigation of the theory surrounding the new movie, “Captain Phillips”

Growing up as a huge Tom Hanks fan, I had to see the new movie “Captain Phillips” that premiered recently in theaters.  For those of you not familiar with the film, it follows the true story of Captain Richard Phillips as his cargo ship is hijacked by pirates of the coast of Somalia in 2009 and is then subsequently taken hostage by the pirates.  After three days as a hostage, the U.S. Navy intervenes and intercepts the pirates who have taken him captive, resulting in the death of the captors and rescue of the captain. 

The trailer for the film can be found here for those interested:

While watching the movie, however, I could not help but make connections back to the anthropological theory so far covered this semester.  

While I am not going to go into all of the possible theoretical connections that can be made to the movie, I am going to mention several that I think are particularly clear.  First and foremost, this movie clearly represents the differences between and emic and etic point of view, one of the major theoretical issues in the field, when comparing my etic view of pirates and the reasoning of the pirates themselves.  Prior to seeing the film, I, like I am sure the majority of others familiar with the actions of pirates both in this situation and other recent news stories, presumed the pirates to simply be relatively evil people with little moral compass or compassion for others, hence their boarding of ships, firing at innocent civilians, and taking of hostages.  However, several instances in the film makes one question these prior beliefs.  Not only does the presence of personality and agency within the pirates add a sort of human factor that media and news sources tend to look past create a closer feeling of emotion and connection the pirates alter my previous ideas surrounding the nature of pirates, certain lines in the film also hit home for me. In one such instance, while Phillips was hostage he turns to one of the pirates and says something along the lines of, “There has to be something to do in Somalia besides fish and kidnap people,” to which the pirate replies, “Maybe in America.” He is referencing the dire situation of many of the people in Somalia and the true lack of other ways to make money to please both one’s superiors and to provide for oneself.  Phillips, like myself, does not see the necessity of piracy when thinking of the comparatively endless amounts of opportunity present in our own American culture.  To the pirates, however, there is no such opportunity.

Along these lines, the next thing to consider is the idea of holism, made popular by Franz Boas.  When using holism, one has to study the entire context in which a trait or pattern occurs.  This is seen in the movie, though at a very minor scale, as the viewer obtains insight as to the lives of the pirates and the reasoning and background to their acts of piracy.  This is exemplified when the pirates refuse to simply leave Phillips’s ship with the $30,000 received aboard and instead kidnap the captain to hold for a ransom upwards of 6 million dollars.  To Phillips, this seems absolutely ridiculous because $30,000 is a large amount of money to any individual.  While Phillips is exasperated by this, one does not realize that the pirates’ bosses will not let them back to their lives and families with such a small amount, demanding a much larger sum and therefore causing the pirates to resort to more desperate and hostile actions.  While this is a very simplistic view of the idea of holism especially when trying to explain the pirates’ situation, it gets the point across.  While not changing the morality of the act, a peek into the holistic point of view creates a deeper understanding of the actions of pirates instead of just seeing it as an act of evil.  

From a Freudian standpoint, the act of piracy can be considered an example of sublimation which is the process of hiding the carnal and base desires of humanity in the constructs of society designed to fulfill and regulate these desires in a culturally specific way.  In this case, piracy may be considered an outlet to a primal urge toward violence.  

While these are just several of the connections between anthropological theory and “Captain Phillips” I believe that the application of such theories to the understanding of the movie creates a much more unique experience.  It opens one’s eyes to context of the situation and helps to incorporate and understand different perspectives and ways of thinking about situations such as this.  This anthropological application also, at least for me, helps to keep in mind the etic nature of news and reporting in general.  I have to reiterate that in no way am I condoning the acts of piracy featured in this film, I just think that anthropological analysis is a very interesting approach to such matters which also shows the broad range of anthropological applicability in thinking about the world and living our lives.

For those of you who are planning to see or already have seen “Captain Phillips” I challenge you to take a step back and keep anthropological theory in mind when watching and critiquing the film.

Whorf on Time

In his article The Relation of Habitual Thought and Behavior to Language, anthropologist Benjamin Lee Whorf forces the reader to reevaluate his or her concept of “time” by comparing cultures and their languages. Along with Edward Sapir, Whorf dedicated his research to the study of the correlation between language and culture. He sought to explore how these two components developed together and how the language of a group of people has the power to shape their perceived reality, and therefore their behavior in society. In his article, Whorf compares SAE (Standard Average European) languages to the Hopi language in order to demonstrate that much of the way the world is perceived is influenced by word choice, grammatical patterns, and linguistic concepts. One of the most thought-provoking examples provided by Whorf addresses the how “time” is conceptualized based on language.
Whorf explains that SAE addresses time as being objective while the Hopi speak of it more subjectively. SAE uses time units as nouns such as “summer,” “second,” “week,” etc. These nouns are “pluralized and numerated like nouns of physical objects,” (142) making time seem like one event after another. The Hopi address time as something more fluid. “Morning” in SAE would be expressed in Hopi as “while morning-phase is occurring” and “summer” would be expressed as “when conditions are hot” or “when heat occurs.” This language creates a perpetual “getting later” of time rather than defined events occurring one after the other. By comparing SAE and Hopi, it is clear that phrasing and the interpretation of time developed together, and define the mental image and understanding of time by their speakers.
For a native SAE speaker, the idea that something as important and central as “time” has multiple interpretations can be shocking. Those who speak languages that originated in Europe accept segmented definitions of time as “truth.” These “truths” are used as foundations for science, literature, and everyday life. It is often not even considered that a concept that is understood to be reality, may simply be just one result of a simultaneous development of language and culture out of many similar developments. Our segmented and defined concept of time is integrated into our daily language, how we organize our life, and how we interpret reality. It is fascinating to recognize that many people think differently, but in order to function in an SAE society, it is necessary to adapt and accept the common manner of conceptualizing “time.” Whorf’s explanation of the concept of time as being linguistic and cultural is fascinating and mind blowing when considered for the first time. It makes a person question his or her perceived reality and accept that what one person understands as an absolute truth may be different for another.




#Eww: A Critique of Whorf The Relation of Habitual Thought and Behavior to Language

           Benjamin Lee Whorf, an associate and student of Edward Sapir, began making influential strides in the direction of American linguistics around the 1930’s. He was part of the Boasian-inspired linguistic movement in America. His article is introduced by an excerpt of Sapir’s that sheds light on the influence of language on the expressions of society. Whorf uses his ideas to build on Sapir’s through the incorporation of contrasts between Hopi and Standard Average European (SAE) language.
He begins his own argument with a simple fire insurance example, explaining how the term “empty” can be used to either signify a bowl of cereal, for instance, that has been eaten as opposed to a complete vacuum containing literally nothing. He explains how, by way of interpreting this word with two different meanings, the use of language can be faulted and cause a miscommunication, which in his example led to an explosion. He expands on this idea by looking extensively into the ways that time and objectifications are interpreted differently in the Hopi and SAE language.
            My favorite idea of his is that of how SAE “objectifies” time, whereas the Hopi “subjectify” this concept. Whorf uses these contrasting words to label the following phenomenon: SAE has the ability to express “ten days” as a cardinal grouping (meaning that one can bunch together ten days with the assumption that they will all happen as individual days within a group of days). The Hopi language expresses time as a continual process of just “becoming later”. Hopi language expresses a group of days as an ordinal concept (meaning that they will come in order). The Hopi language only uses cardinal numbers to express an amount that is physically present, unlike a number of days which is only conceptualized in our minds. This is explained by the fact that the Hopi language is rooted in nature while SAE is in a sense, more imaginary. This concept of Hopi language only expressing what is naturally and physically present streams through Whorf’s entire work as he contrasts the two languages.

            Whorf conveys the idea that language and culture have a fairly symbiotic relationship, but while recognizing the fact that that they have evolved together, he illustrates the idea that language has more of a limiting effect on culture. He explains at the end of his article that language is more of a slowly changing and more permanent entity, while culture has the ability to change more often.  I do agree that in comparison with culture “language is a system, not just an assemblage of norms” (p156) but I argue his idea that language is “affected little and slowly” (p 156). While the underlying structure of SAE is fairly solidified, words within language are changing constantly. Especially with increased internet usage, new words are constantly being created, spread across the globe, and then transmitted verbally. Just last class, we had the phrase “#eww” written on the board, and there was a unanimous understanding of this phrase among our classmates. My freshmen year I would have had no idea what the pound symbol was doing in front of the word eww, whereas now I know that the hashtag symbol is a way to organize thoughts into categories. Does this mean that this expression is encouraging individuals to clump ideas into groups more than they would have in the past? Has our modern need for efficiency and organization required the creation of such a symbol? Whorf would have probably understood the symbiotic relationship that the two have and go on to explain how the thoughts and behaviors of further generations will be affected by this modern phenomenon, while the phrase itself was founded on an adjustment of culture.

Monday, October 7, 2013

The Flood Myth

From a structural functionalist's point of view, observation--an integral facet of anthropological fieldwork--never reveals the isolated performance of a single societal mechanism, but rather the complex interaction between a multitude of mental cogwheels. It is this system of interlocking gears, each of which is defined in one way or another by the mind's tendency to compartmentalize environmental data, that spins in harmony to create a template for one's culture. In this sense, each of a society's individuals develop a unique (yet largely similar) interpretation of how the system is to run, and consequently how to respond to certain stimuli. 

What then is an observer to do when thrust into an alien landscape and culture? The observer enters foreign systems with a preconceived notion of how each gear is to interact, but imagine his or her surprise to realize this new system of gears differ in shape, color, and size! The inhabitants of this novel land have redefined the very building blocks of culture itself, and it is the task of the observer to document, in excruciating detail, the nuances of this strange people and place. 

As the observer settles into the new system, he or she is introduced to the people's core belief system. It is this particular gear that acts as a system-wide lubricant--ensuring the culture as a whole remains both socially intact and efficient. But what is the observer to do when this belief system does not match up with the laws governing the observer's world? How can one digest without bias an explanation for life that fails to meet, for example, the laws of physics? These are the types of myths Levi-Strauss recounts in Structuralism and Ecology--the kind that not only failed to meet his own belief system, but also appeared to contradict the very systems they were meant to ensure. Native accounts of mystical creatures and impossible actions--the likes of which Strauss no doubt could convey to a child/grandchild as fairy tales before bedtime--appeared baffling on the surface. That is, until Levi-Strauss took them in the context of adjacent systems. While these adjacent systems belonged to entirely different cultures, they more often than not featured an attachment to the same myth.

Having donned my "structuralist" hat, I would like to propose the analysis of the Flood Myth through the lens of both Christianity and Mesopotamian lore. Without delving into explicit detail, the Bible recounts an Earth-engulfing flood occurring in the book of Genesis due to God's anger with humanity's general behavior. Sparing a man named Noah, his family, and an array of animals, God then unleashes a torrent of water upon the land--utterly destroying all life and leaving his chosen to repopulate the land. 

When taken at face value, it is easy to discount this tale as pure, unadulterated fantasy. After all, we know that in no way could a pair of animals repopulate an entire species, and no empirical research yields even an inkling of evidence that at any time since the Earth's inception did a flood ever overtake continent-level land swaths instantaneously. How then would Levi-Strauss, a staunch believer in the underlying relevancy of all myths, go about analyzing the biblical flood? No doubt, his studies would inevitably take him into the Epic of Gilgamesh. Dated to approximately 2700 BCE, the Epic of Gilgamesh too features a section in which Gilgamesh’s grandfather constructs at the behest of the gods “a boat of 120 cubits,” boards it with a select company, and survives a seven day flood of immense proportions.

The obvious parallels running between the biblical flood and the one encountered in Gilgamesh have manifested themselves time and time again throughout cultural history. From the lore of the K’iche’ and Mayan people of Central America, to the Hindu text Satapatha Brahmana, the flood myth motif is a structural functionalist’s field day, as it reveals much about the basic structuring of human mental structures—specifically, our fascination with the cycle of destruction/cleansing and renewal via the authority of a divine being. 

Levi-Strauss argues that the process of dichotomizing environmental stimuli is integral to human survivability, as we function more efficiently knowing without hesitation what is and is not beneficial. I would argue that the widespread use of flood narratives across early cultures acts as a dichotomization of behavior in relation to divine will--that is, leading a “bad” life increases society’s chance of destruction by the divine. While what defines a “bad” life is left up to cultural interpretation, each flood story is centered upon punishing the impure, evil members of society, while the divine’s chosen (more often than not portrayed as a noble, inherently “good” figure) emerges from the devastation unscathed. In this sense, the flood myth acts as a both a creation story (i.e. everything alive today has descended from God's chosen survivors) and a potent forewarning against a life contrary to divine will.